While bureaucratic salaries, particularly those of a single agency, may seem to have little bearing on the subject indicated in the title of this essay, the Foreign Ministry-aside from being the one Ottoman government agency whose personnel records are available to researchers as a discrete corpus of manageable size-was particularly important in the rise of the modernist intelligentsia. This was especially true in the generation of the Young Ottomans, almost all of whose leaders were associated with this ministry. While less strong in the generation of the Young Turks, whose leaders came from both military and civil services, the link to the civil bureaucracy was a significant fact of that period, too.8 The economic fortunes of less elite segments of Ottoman society are now becoming better known,9 and we shall make at least some comparative comments about them in this discussion. Given limited but growing political mobilization in this period, however, the economic fortunes of the elites surely had more to do with the origins of major political movements than did those of the masses, however important the latter were in responding to opposition appeals.
I. FOREIGN MINISTRY SALARIES
In 1877, the Ottoman government began to keep official personnel records, including regular mention of salary changes. Data collected from all recoverable files of career officials of the Foreign Ministry provide the basis for a study of bureaucratic salaries throughout roughly the second half of the nineteenth century. Analysis of the salaries presents problems pertaining to the representativeness of the data, the monetary unit of payment, the relation of the salary figures in the records to the actual receipts of the officials, and variations over the years in the numbers and seniority of the officials for whom there are data. Once the observations and adjustments that can be made in response to these problems, as set forth in the appendix, have been carried out, we are in position to open discussion of the salary structure by presenting series of adjusted means and medians. These figures are shown in Table 1 , and are presented graphically in Figure 1 . Consideration of the means and 8 Phrases liked bureaucratic intelligentsia are justified in speaking of the Ottoman elites in the sense that, historically, government service was the predominant, almost the exclusive, way for intellectuals to earn their livelihoods. One of the best-charted themes of nineteenth-century Ottoman history is the link between reform and the creation of a Western-oriented "modernist" segment within the bureaucratic intelligentsia. In the civil bureaucracy, the Foreign Ministry played the key role in shaping the modernist leadership that dominated the government during the Tanzimat. The rise of the Young Ottomans in the 1860s represents the emergence from the "modernist intelligentsia" of a movement opposing the leading Tanzimat statesmen. About the same time, bureaucratic and literary careers were also beginning to differentiate, a process linked especially to the rise of journalism (Mardin, Perhaps the most conspicuous point in these salary statistics is that the means are almost invariably higher than the medians. The greater the gap, the stronger the indication that the salary distribution was inegalitarian, with many low salaries and a few higher ones. The greater the inequality, the greater the extent to which the median-the midmost salary when all salaries are ranked by amount-excels the mean as an indicator of the fortunes of most members of the group studied. The mean-median gap does narrow over The ideal way to learn more about the salary distribution would be to compute statistical measures of dispersion, but this is not possible with the manipulated data distribution that emerges from the controls for seniority. One way to get around this problem, and incidentally to learn more about salaries in the preceding period, is to compare the salary of the highest official of the ministry, the foreign minister, with the lowest salary paid there. Since Ottoman officials normally began their careers as unpaid apprentices, verification of the lowest salary presents no problem. There were always officials with a salary of zero. The salaries of the ministers, however, varied over time in ways that reinforce the implications of the mean-median gap shown in Figure 1 . Because indications of these salaries appear both in the personnel records and in other sources, extending back to the 1830s, the available data on this point cover a much longer span of time than the statistics in Table 1 .
Examining notations of the amounts of foreign ministers' salaries, we find that, of eight mentions for 1838-76, seven were in the range of 60,000 to 75,000 kuru? per month; and the one anomaly, in 1872, was 50,000-still more than forty times the median for that year, shown in Table 1 .10 Recent studies indicate that an Ottoman laborer would have been fortunate to earn 250 kurus per month in the early 1870s; thus the dimensions of Ottoman bureaucratic elitism emerge clearly from these figures."I The military and fiscal crises of the late 1870s lowered the minister's salary to around 40,000 kurus per month. 12 For 1880-84, it fell again, by half, to an all-time low of 20,000 kuru. 13 In 1885-95, the figure was again 30,000 per month.14 From 1896 through the Young Turk revolution, the salary wavered in the range of 36-46,000 kuru?. In the purges and salary cuts that followed the revolution, the minister's salary fell to 25 These figures from 1914 take us as far as it is possible to go with currently available cost-of-living estimates. We can, however, prepare for a different approach to the salary-price comparison by converting the adjusted salary statistics shown in Table 1 into percentage relatives, which we shall later compare with a grain price average expressed in the same terms.30 Table 2 presents the salary relatives, analysis of which follows in the last section of this study. Since, for every commodity, several varieties or provenances were quoted, I computed commodity averages as averages of varietal subseries. The procedure was to select for each variety all years in which there were quotations for at least three quarters. From each subseries, all other years were excluded as offering insufficient control for seasonal fluctuations. Averaging the quotations for the selected years produced varietal price series, which were then averaged to produce the commodity averages in Table 3 . To minimize the impact of price differences among commodities on the composite grain price average, I computed it as an average of percentage relatives (Table 4 ). The computation of percentage relatives is explained in note 30. Again 1880-82-an interval intermediate, in terms of both time and price-efforts to take account of a larger range of commodities foundered on the fact that many of the items quoted were not consumer goods, or not directly so, while varieties and quality grades of some consumer goods, such as tea and sugar, varied so widely over time as to be unintelligible.
While concentration on grains was more a matter of necessity than choice, grain products were and are extremely important in the Turkish diet. The prime example of this is bread, of which the average Ottoman at the turn of this century reportedly consumed a kilogram or more a day.37 As a Levantine woman of Istanbul once explained to an Englishman, "vous etes carnivore, je suis carnipain."38 The price of bread was officially controlled in Istanbul, so that the effects of shifts in wholesale wheat and flour prices were passed on to the consumer only intermittently. This does not, however, deprive wheat and flour prices of value as indicators of movements in the economy. Too, Ottoman bakers had ways, at times, of "disadjusting" the official bread price, for example, by decreasing loaf size.39 And Ottomans consumed other baked goods, various types of noodles, cracked wheat (bulgur), and other grain products.
With this introduction, we may now examine the price tables. The most important feature of the composite grain average is no doubt the extent to which it parallels well-known fluctuations in other major markets of the period. In the midst of a downward price trend for grains and other commodities that spanned almost the entire nineteeth century, we find a cyclical rise into the 1870s, followed by a decline to depression levels in the 1890s, and then an upturn that lasted, on the world market, until 1920.42
Superimposed on this pattern, however, are short-term peaks, usually attributable to local or regional crises. The first and sharpest peak in 1854-56 coincides with the Crimean War. That of 1867-68 coincides not only with a price peak in the international grain markets,43 but also with the Cretan crisis of 1866-69.44 Occurring at a time when the financial position of the Ottoman government was steadily worsening, the crisis caused economic strain, which the Young Ottoman ideologues did not fail to exploit.45 In 1868, distress was so great in Istanbul that the wives of officials serving in the provinces besieged the Ministry of Finance in screaming mobs, demanding their husbands' salaries. The finance minister had to be assigned a special guard. Public security virtually ceased to exist on the outskirts of the city and declined within it.46
The 1870s brought graver troubles. The Anatolian famine of the early 1870s had limited effect on the Istanbul market because little Anatolian produce could reach the capital as yet. Even so, prices went up, for 1873 marked a cyclical high on the world grain market. The first half of the 1870s was also a time of troubles for the civil bureaucracy, in the sense that instability of political leadership heightened uncertainty of tenure in office, the probability of nonpayment of salaries, and even inefficiency in tax collection.47 The second half of the 1870s was one of the lowest points of the entire nineteenth century for the Ottomans, a fact evidenced especially in the government bankruptcy and the Russo-Turkish War, which brought the Russian army to the outskirts of Istanbul, flooded the city with refugees, and left the Ottoman government saddled with a huge indemnity. One result was the reissue of 
III. CONCLUSION: LIVING STANDARDS AND SHIFTING LEVELS OF POLITICAL ACTIVISM
From the salary-price comparison emerge the conclusions of this essay. Since there is no sign in Ottoman sources that salaries varied systematically with prices prior to World War I,55 the best way to compare the two is to assume no statistical dependence of one series on the other. We shall simply compute two sets of ratios by dividing each year's relatives for the adjusted salary means and medians (Table 2) by the same year's relative for the composite grain price average (Table 4 ). In the few years for which the grain average is missing, it will not be possible to compute these ratios. In any year when the relative for the salary statistic is greater than that for the grain average, the value for the ratio will be greater than one. When the opposite relationship occurs, the ratio will be less than one. The lower the value of the ratio, the greater the economic distress it implies. Table 5 presents these ratios. The salary-price ratios show that the economic situation of Foreign Ministry officials varied widely over time. The late 1860s and the 1870s witnessed a marked erosion of living standards. Qualitative evidence confirms this point. In the previous section, we noted riots by the wives of officials in 1868, followed in the 1870s by problems stemming from administrative irregularities, government bankruptcy, and the Russo-Turkish War.
After 1880, an improvement in official living standards appears to have begun, as evidenced in the doubling of both of the Table 5 ratios by 1894. Even if the fall in grain prices exceeded that in other goods, there was still room for ratios computed on a broader-based price indicator to show marked improvement during this interval. While the Ottoman economy was predominantly agricultural, and agricultural prices were falling between 1880 and 1894, an improvement in the living standards of officials, or of other social groups, is not implausible. The late nineteenth century witnessed an important railroad-related expansion in Ottoman agriculture, the effects of which in some ways outweighed those of the price declines. Expansion in agricultural output and export values did not translate directly into increase in government revenues or, by extension, into funds available to the government for salary payments, as a growing number of Ottoman taxes passed under control of foreign creditors in these years.56 The significance of this fact for official salary payments is not clear, given the limited information now available about how salary payments were actually made. In any case, the qualitative evidence for 1880-94 tacitly reinforces the evidence of Table 5 Table 2 by the composite grain price averages in Table 4. absence of reports of distress like that of the 1860s or 1870s, though there was suffering from irregularity in salary payments.
After 1894, things changed again, mainly thanks to the rise in prices (Table  4) What is most interesting is the correspondence between these economic fluctuations and the political and intellectual history of the period. Here we find a parallelism clear enough to suggest a causal link between economic distress and political agitation. A statistical argument, like that central to this article, cannot in itself prove the existence of such a link; but some of the evidence here considered, and some that emerges from other scholarship, does indicate a causal connection, which we must emphasize as our final point.58
58 One way to appreciate the strength of the causal argument in this case is to obey the dictates of a strict concern for method and consider the null hypothesis that there was no connection between economic distress and political behavior. Aside from some contrary evidence already presented, one of the best ways to assess this hypothesis is to examine how von Wangenheim, then German charge at Istanbul-he was ambassador there in 1914-dealt with the same idea in a dispatch of 1901 (Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen Amtes (Bonn), Tiirkei 134, Bd. 18, to von Bulow, 26 August 1901, corresponding to T 139, roll 392, in the microfilm collection of the United States National Archives). Commenting on press reports that Ottoman officials in Istanbul and Salonica had petitioned the sultan to have their back salaries paid, on the ground that they and their families would starve otherwise, Wangenheim argued that it would be wrong to conclude from this that there was any danger of revolution. One of his arguments was that officials and military officers blamed their problems, not on the sultan, but on their superiors, with the result that complaints like these served the sultan's efforts to maintain his own political dominance. Another argument concerned the likelihood of starvation. The ability of poor Turks to get by on very little excelled even what he had seen in Spain, wrote Wangenheim. To back up the point, he described how elderly Turks would fish on the landing in front of the embassy summer residence at Tarabya on the Bosphorus. Too, poor Turks carried the sharing of goods "to the socialdemocratic ideal," and shopkeepers also would take mercy on the poor, so that the shocking indigence observable in other European capitals was unseen. Turks in office had the added advantage of enjoying influence, which enabled them to extract bribes from the public. Knowing that they did so enabled the sultan to accustom his officials to irregular salary payments. Salary payments had thus reached the point of being "a special act of grace by the ruler, announced in the newspapers, and celebrated almost like a national holiday," not only by the officials, but also by the tradesmen who supplied them on credit between paydays. Only Christians and foreigners in Ottoman service suffered, Wangenheim argued, as they lacked access to the Muslims' business arrangements and love for their fellows. Wangenheim's comments on the sultan's manipulation of salary payments are probably worth taking seriously. Yet it is quite unclear why a Christian Ottoman official could find no support among his coreligionists, at any rate. Even more perplexing is the ingenious way Wangenheim's argument channeled the grievances of Ottoman officials into a limbo where they had neither severe human costs for the officials nor political costs for the regime. Perhaps in gratification at this conclusion, a pencil note below Wangenheim's signature, probably by von Billow, states: "very well written and correctly observed." In fact, the argument is a piece of orientalism in the sense of Edward Said. Why should the behavior of poor old Turks, fishing on a landing, have provided any better guide to the political behavior of Ottoman officials and military officers than that of peasants digging potatoes in Prussia would have provided to the behavior of German diplomats like Wangenheim? Apart from having discussed these old men with his Montenegrin doorman, as he says, how well did Wangenheim understand them? It is not worthwhile to belabor such questions, since the kind of argument Wangenheim sought to make could be updated and strengthened. Yet the fact remains that revolution came only seven years after he wrote this dispatch and that Salonica and Istanbul, the sources of the news reports on which he commented, were its most important centers.
To sum up the evidence for this causal link, we may start from the point that both periods of political and ideological ferment, those of the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks, were times of economic distress. In both periods the distress extended well beyond the official milieu from which the salary statistics derive.59 And in both periods the ideologues and activists displayed at least some responsiveness to economic problems. Among the Young Ottoman leadership, almost all of whom came from extremely privileged backgrounds, the response may not have gone much beyond denunciation of general grievances, such as foreign commercial privileges or the public debt.60 Given the massive long-term problems of the Ottoman economy, it was perhaps natural for the earliest ideologues to respond more to them than to specific short-term problems. Later, the Young Turks appear to have coupled discussion of general issues with exploitation of specific crisis conditions. No doubt, the extent to which the scope of political mobilization had broadened by then contributed to this result. Those who joined or responded to the Young Turk movement included not only civil bureaucrats and large elements of the military, but also nonbureaucratic elites, members of the nonMuslim communities, sometimes even workers. The connections between Young Turk activists and these various groups are not all well established. The roots of the movement in the civil bureaucratic and military elites are, of course, best known.61 In the case of the workers, to cite a less-known example that is particularly significant where political mobilization is concerned, Young Turk activists had forged alliances with aggrieved worker groups before revolution broke out in 1908, and had apparently led at least one Luddite disturbance, which resulted in good part from the current economic crisis. Considering how little research has been done in Ottoman labor history, it is highly likely that more such examples of economically motivated political activism await discovery. In considering the correspondence between economic and politicalintellectual history, the interval in the 1870s and 1880s between the Young Ottoman and Young Turk periods is also significant. Economically, it was a time of relief for the bureaucratic intelligentsia, and probably for other sectors of society, too. Politically, it was the period when Abdtilhamid quashed the opposition and consolidated his palace regime. Making due allowance for his intelligence and the authority of his office, it seems-unless we suppose these economic and political facts to be unrelated-that the last great flourish of Ottoman sultanism was made possible in some degree by a detente, if it was no more than that, in the general economic decline of the empire. When the benefits of this detente began to dwindle, political opposition re-emerged, sultan or no sultan. After the economic situation took a sharp downturn in 1907, revolution broke out. Here we have another example of James C. Since gold was mostly hoarded, and paper money circulated for only a few of the years for which statistics appear in the tables in the text, the silver mecidiye must have been the primary unit for salary payment. Converting salaries assumed to be stated in silver into units of constant value becomes a problem after the value of silver began to decline in the 1870s. By the early 1880s, it took 108 kurus in silver to buy a gold lira (equal to 100 kurus in gold). On the world market, the value of silver declined much further thereafter. In Istanbul, however, the Ottoman silver coinage held steady around 108 kurus to the gold lira through 1914, according to the money rates published in local newspapers. Variation over Time in the Number of Officials for Whom Salary Data are Available. I calculated salary statistics for the period 1850-1914, but found that the number of cases dropped off, and the statistics became erratic, at both ends of that period. For the earlier years, the cause of the trouble is that the personnel records were not created until 1877. The records cover the individual's lifespan from birth forward. Thus, the oldest files contain data for years long before 1877; yet, the further back one looks, the fewer the cases. The problem in the later years arises from the purges that followed the For the median, as a positional statistic, there is no counterpart of standardization. Because the distortions of the seniority distribution lie mostly in the lack of senior officials in the earlier years, and of junior officials after 1893, the best alternative seemed to be to compute medians for only the middle seniority bracket, comprising officials with 15-29 years of service as of each year of computation. Of course, this method further reduces the number of cases used in calculation. Since the maximum number of cases in the 15-29 year bracket in any year is 84, I shall show no statistics for any year without at least 21 cases. Because of differences in the adjustment techniques for means and medians, the years for which these statistics appear in the tables differ slightly.
